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Abstract
Credit unions differ in the types of financial services they offer to their members. This paper
explicitly models this observed heterogeneity using a generalized model of endogenous ordered
switching. Our approach captures the endogenous choice that credit unions make when adding
new products to their financial services mix. The model that we consider also allows for the
dependence between unobserved effects and regressors in both the selection and outcome equa-
tions and can accommodate the presence of predetermined covariates in the model. We use this
model to estimate returns to scale for U.S. retail credit unions from 1996 to 2011. We document
strong evidence of persistent technological heterogeneity among credit unions offering different
financial service mixes, which, if ignored, can produce quite misleading results. Employing our
model, we find that credit unions of all types exhibit substantial economies of scale.
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1 Introduction
U.S. credit unions continue to prosper despite the decline in their relative advantages over com-
mercial banks. Factors such as increasing availability of credit information from national credit-
reporting bureaus, establishment of the federal deposit insurance fund for credit unions and the
growth in credit card lending by larger financial institutions have significantly eroded conventional
benefits of doing business at the local, small-scale level (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Walter, 2006).
This has motivated credit unions to evolve.
With the authorization to issue long-term mortgage loans in 1977 and the passage of the Credit
Union Membership Access Act of 1998 which empowered them to widen and diversify their mem-
bership scope, credit unions have grown significantly in an attempt to compensate for the loss of
traditional competitive advantages by capitalizing on economies of scale. Over the past decade, the
average size of (federally-insured) credit unions has increased from $57.5 million to $135.8 million
in assets. As of the end of 2011, the industry accounted for about a trillion dollars in assets and
more than 92 million members (authors’ calculations based on NCUA, 2011).
Several studies have investigated the performance of U.S. credit unions.1 However, to our
knowledge, no attempt has been made to formally model credit unions’ technologies taking into
consideration their differing output mixes (that is, different financial service menus they offer to
their members). This limits our understanding of the industry structure, its evolution and the
potential impact of alternative policies. Most previous studies have encountered the same problem,
namely, the presence of a large number of observations for which the reported values of credit
unions’ outputs are zeros. This issue has been handled either by linearly aggregating different
types of outputs into larger bundles (Fried et al., 1999; Frame and Coelli, 2001; Wheelock and
Wilson, 2011, 2013) or by replacing zero outputs with an arbitrary small positive number (Frame
et al., 2003). These methods may however be inappropriate since they do not recognize that the
existence of zero-value outputs provides valuable information regarding the choice of the production
technology by credit unions.
To preview the importance of modeling the choice of credit unions’ technology (which we discuss
in detail in Section 3), consider Table 1 which presents the number of retail credit unions in each
year between 1994 and 2011 with zero values reported for some (or all) of the four outputs commonly
considered in the literature. All credit unions2 report non-zero values for consumer loans (y3) which
historically have been their main product. However, there is a strikingly large number of credit
unions that offer no real estate (y1) or business loans (y2) to their members throughout the years
we consider. This evidence favors our view that not all credit unions are alike. Given that the
output mix differs across units and over time, a substantial time-persistent heterogeneity may exist
among credit unions.
We view this observed heterogeneity as an outcome of an endogenous choice made by credit
union managers. They decide what range of services to offer to their members and choose the
appropriate technology to provide them. Thus, it is likely that the production technology which a
credit union employs varies with its output mix. To our knowledge, this technological heterogeneity
(defined by the output mix) has been either assumed to be exogenous and/or entirely taken for
granted in all previous studies. The aggregation of outputs into broader categories to solve the
zero-output problem, so often practiced in the literature, constitutes the loss of information in both
econometric and economic senses. The results previously reported in the literature are therefore
likely to be misleading since the used econometric models ignore the time-persistent heterogeneity
1See Wheelock and Wilson (2011, 2013) and the references therein.
2With the exception of a single entity.
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Table 1. Zero-Value Observations, 1994–2011
Year y1 y2 y3 y4 Total Year y1 y2 y3 y4 Total
1994 3,670 9,063 0 3 9,783 2004 2,344 7,099 1 64 8,209
1995 3,517 9,056 0 0 9,734 2005 2,171 6,695 1 57 7,948
1996 3,555 9,162 0 2 9,891 2006 2,044 6,333 1 68 7,718
1997 3,441 9,059 0 0 9,765 2007 1,952 6,101 1 59 7,506
1998 3,269 8,811 0 0 9,561 2008 1,805 5,703 1 38 7,174
1999 3,140 8,650 0 55 9,426 2009 1,485 5,086 1 55 6,521
2000 2,925 8,442 0 75 9,195 2010 1,612 5,306 1 115 6,761
2001 2,764 8,114 0 61 8,932 2011 1,539 5,212 1 61 6,591
2002 2,601 7,739 0 61 8,611 Total 46,377 133,152 9 870 151,817
2003 2,543 7,521 1 96 8,491
NOTES: The variables are defined as follows: y1 - real estate loans, y2 - business and agricultural loans, y3 - consumer
loans, y4 - investments.
arising from the endogenous selection of credit unions’ technologies.3
Heterogeneity among credit unions is unlikely to be limited to the technology they use; each
credit union is unique in its operations. Ignoring this unobserved heterogeneity when estimating
credit unions’ technology (which is customary in the existing literature4) may produce inconsistent
estimates since unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with covariates present in the
estimated equation. While such credit-union-specific unobserved effects cannot be accounted for
in a cross-sectional setting due to the incidental parameters problem, we address this issue in our
case by taking advantage of the panel structure of the data.
In this paper, we address the above concerns by developing a unified framework that allows
the estimation of credit union technologies that is robust to (i) misspecification due to an a priori
assumption of homogeneous technology, (ii) selectivity bias due to ignoring the endogeneity in
technology selection, and (iii) endogeneity (omitted variable) bias due to the failure to account for
unobserved union-specific effects that are correlated with covariates in the estimated equations.
The estimation of such a model is not trivial. As we demonstrate in Section 3, the data in-
dicate that 99% of all U.S. retail credit unions employ one of the three technologies associated
with different output mixes offered by these institutions. These technologies have an ordered rela-
tionship: they go from a simpler to a more complex output mix. The existing literature on panel
data selection models with unobserved heterogeneity focuses mainly on binary selection, and few
papers allow for dependence between unobserved effects and covariates in both the outcome and
the selection equations (see the references in Section 2). Among those studies that do allow for the
latter, most rely on the assumption of strict exogeneity of covariates throughout the entire model
(e.g., Wooldridge, 1995; Kyriazidou, 1997; Rochina-Barrachina, 1999) or at least in the selection
equation (e.g., Charlier et al., 2001; Lee and Vella, 2006; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010) which
is particularly hard to justify in our application.
3Heterogeneity among credit unions has been also studied, although from a somewhat different perspective, in Whee-
lock and Wilson (2011) who estimate credit unions’ cost function via kernel methods, thus avoiding any functional
specification for the underlying technology and obtaining observation-specific estimates of the cost function. How-
ever, the aggregation of all types of loans into a single output, which the authors resort to, does not allow them to
account for the (endogenous) heterogeneity resulting from differing output mixes, which our paper emphasizes.
4To our knowledge, Frame et al. (2003) is the only study which attempts to estimate (homogeneous) credit unions’
technology using panel data while allowing for unobserved heterogeneity among institutions. However, the latter
is modeled as random effects under a strong assumption of its exogeneity which is unlikely to be supported by the
data.
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Gayle and Viauroux (2007) study a dynamic panel data sample selection model quite similar
to ours, where both the outcome and selection equations are permitted to contain predetermined
variables as well as unobserved effects. However, to identify their model they require the presence
of some strictly exogenous time-invariant variables in the selection equation. This assumption is
however too restrictive for our application and is unlikely to be supported by the data. In a related
study, Arellano and Carrasco (2003) study a single-equation binary choice dynamic panel data
model with predetermined covariates and unobserved effects that are allowed to be correlated with
the explanatory variables, which is similar to our technology selection equation. Given our empirical
application, we propose a model of ordered selection, conditional on predetermined covariates, that
allows for correlated unobserved effects in both the selection and outcome equations. To our
knowledge, no such model has been considered in the literature.
We contribute to the literature by (i) extending Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator to the case of
ordered selection and the presence of predetermined covariates in the model and (ii) applying this
framework to estimate the returns to scale for U.S. retail credit unions in 1996-2011. The latter has
been recently brought into the spotlight of scholarly discourse (Emmons and Schmid, 1999; Wilcox,
2005, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 2011). We compare our estimates to those (potentially biased
and inconsistent) obtained by ignoring heterogeneity due to endogenous technology selection and
unobserved effects.
We find that not all U.S. retail credit unions are alike. There is evidence of persistent techno-
logical heterogeneity among credit unions offering different financial service mixes. We consistently
reject the null hypotheses of exogenous technology selection and homogeneous (common) technol-
ogy among credit unions. We further find that ignoring this observed heterogeneity and unobserved
time-invariant effects across credit unions leads to downward biases in returns to scale estimates. In
particular, models that do not account for parameter heterogeneity, endogenous switching and/or
dependence between unobserved effects and right-hand-side covariates can produce the misleading
finding that 6 to 20% of credit unions offering all types of loans suffer from diseconomies of scale
and are thus scale-inefficient. This result broadly vanishes when we address all the concerns we
raise in this paper. We find that most credit unions (of all technology types) exhibit substantial
economies of scale. Hence, the growth of the industry is far from reaching its peak. We therefore
expect a policy debate over credit unions’ tax-exempt status and their special regulatory treatment
compared with commercial banks to reignite in the near future. As these institutions grow in size
and complexity, they may become of systemic importance. Regulators should be aware of these
trends to contain threats that credit unions may potentially pose for local and national economies.
We also note that our generalized model is not tailored to the analysis of credit unions only.
The framework can be applied to any other panel data study where selectivity and both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity are present. Some examples would be studies of electric or water
utilities, which often include both specialized and integrated companies that operate under non-
homogeneous production technologies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe our panel data model of endogenous
ordered switching under sequential exogeneity in Section 2. Section 3 provides a description of the
data as well as a discussion of how we identify heterogeneous credit union technologies. Section 4
presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 A Panel Data Model of Endogenous Ordered Switching
This section develops an econometric model that we employ to investigate underlying differences
in heterogeneous technologies across U.S. credit unions. The model (i) avoids imposing a strong
assumption of homogeneous technology uniformly adopted by all credit unions irrespective of the
service mix they offer to their members; (ii) explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of the selection
of these different technologies by unions over the course of time; and (iii) allows for unobserved
time-invariant correlated effects amongst credit unions.
Consider a dual cost function of an s-type credit union i in period t:
Cs,it =
{
x′s,itβs + αs,i + us,it if Tit = s
− otherwise (2.1a)
T ∗it = d
′
it−1ρt + z
′
it−1γt + ξi + eit , (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , tmax; s = 1, . . . , S) (2.1b)
where Cs,it is the total variable, non-interest cost (the outcome variable); and xs,it is a Ks × 1
vector of strictly exogenous relevant cost function covariates as later defined in Section 3 (including
unity for the intercept), with the corresponding parameter vector βs of conformable dimension.
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The outcome variable Cs,it is observed only if the sth technology is selected, i.e., if Tit = s. T
∗
it
is a latent variable governing the technology selection by a credit union i in period t, given the
technology selected in the previous period Tit−1 and an L×1 vector of some relevant lagged variables
zit−1. We condition the technology selection in period t on the lagged technology Tit−1 in order
to allow for the state dependence of technology types over time. That is, a credit union naturally
considers the financial services mix it currently offers to its members when making a decision about
the composition of the mix for the next period. The state dependence is modeled via d′it−1ρt,
where dit−1 ≡ (1{Tit−1 = 1}, . . . ,1{Tit−1 = S})′ with the corresponding S×1 parameter vector ρt.6
Further, we postulate the selection equation (2.1b) as a function of the lagged z variables in order
to avoid making a strong assumption of contemporaneous or strict exogeneity of z which is unlikely
to be supported by the data. Instead, we make a milder assumption of the predeterminedness of
zit−1.7 For a more elaborate discussion of the latter assumption, see Section 3. Parameter vector
(ρt,γt) is time-varying which allows for unrestricted temporal dynamics of eit. Lastly, (αs,i, ξi)
are time-invariant, credit-union-specific unobserved effects. The subscript s denotes the technology
type.
In Section 3, we show that the data point to three distinct credit union technologies associated
with different output mixes and that there exists a clear ordered (nested) relationship between
these technologies. Hence, it is natural to think of the latent variable T ∗it as measuring a credit
union’s propensity to select a more complex (diverse) output mix. The technology s is selected if
and only if
Tit = s ⇔ µs−1,t < T ∗it ≤ µs,t , (2.2)
5In this paper, we consider the widely used translog cost function. Thus, to be exact, the left-hand-side variable will
be the log of the total variable, non-interest cost, and the vector xs,it will include the second-order log-polynomial
of the cost function covariates. For more details, see Section 4.
6We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this particular way of modeling state dependence. Clearly, for the
identification purposes, one of the dummy variables for the past technology type needs to be dropped during the
estimation.
7We acknowledge that the technology selection equation in (2.1b) may not be the true “structural” rule used by
credit union managers when selecting their production technology. Rather, it can be thought of as a reduced-form
representation of such a rule. Given that the technology selection process itself is of secondary interest, our choice
of such a reduced-form modeling of switching seems reasonable.
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where µs,t ∈ {µ0,t, . . . , µS,t} is a time-varying threshold.
Define xs,i ≡ (x′s,i1, . . . ,x′s,itmax)′, wit ≡ (d′it, z′it)′ and wti ≡ (w′i1, . . . ,w′it)′. While we assume
that the error terms us,it and eit are orthogonal to xs,i and w
t−1
i , their distributions are however
allowed to be correlated, namely E
[
us,iteit
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i ] 6= 0. Note that the above model is a gen-
eralization of a standard endogenous switching regression model to a case of ordered choice with
the assumption of strict exogeneity of covariates in the selection equation being relaxed to weak
(sequential) exogeneity.
The estimation of generalized model (2.1) is not trivial. While there has been a great interest
in extending traditional limited dependent variable models to the case of panel data which permits
controlling for unobserved effects, the literature on such models incorporated into linear regressions
with selectivity mainly focuses on binary selection (for a comprehensive review, see Baltagi, 2013).
These panel data selection models differ in their assumptions about the form of the unobserved
heterogeneity in outcome and selection equations: whether (exogenous) random effects are assumed
in both equations (e.g., Ridder, 1990; Verbeek and Nijman, 1996) or in the selection equation only
(e.g., Verbeek, 1990). Few attempts have been made to allow for unobserved effects that correlate
with right-hand-side covariates in both the outcome and selection equations. In the case of strictly
exogenous covariates, some approaches to tackle such effects in panel sample selection models are
those of Wooldridge (1995), Kyriazidou (1997) and Rochina-Barrachina (1999).8 For a concise
comparison of these estimators, see Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).
Nonetheless, the above methods are not applicable in our case, since the selection equation
(2.1b) contains predetermined covariates.9 Gayle and Viauroux (2007) propose a three-stage semi-
parametric sieve estimator of a dynamic panel data sample selection model quite similar to ours
in (2.1), where both the outcome and binary selection equations are permitted to contain prede-
termined variables as well as unobserved effects. However, one of the key restrictions needed to
identify Gayle and Viauroux’s (2007) model is the assumption that unobserved effects in the selec-
tion equation are correlated with a strictly exogenous time-invariant component of zit−1 only (in
our notation). The latter assumption is however too restrictive for our application and is unlikely
to be supported by the data, as discussed in Section 3. On the other hand, Arellano and Carrasco
(2003) study a binary choice (dynamic) panel data model with predetermined covariates and un-
observed effects that are allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables, which is similar
to our selection equation (2.1b).10
Given the research question that we posit in this paper, we consider a model of ordered choice,
conditional on predetermined covariates, that allows for correlated unobserved effects in both the
selection and outcome equations. To our knowledge, no such model has been considered in the
literature. We thus fill this void by generalizing Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator to the case of
ordered selection and the presence of predetermined covariates in the model. For the generalization
of Wooldridge (1995) to the case of polychotomous selection under strict exogeneity, see Malikov
and Kumbhakar (2014).
We first formalize the selection equation (2.1b), where we build upon Arellano et al.’s (1999)
and Arellano and Carrasco’s (2003) setup.
Assumption 1. For i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , tmax and s = 1, . . . , S:
8Also see Magnac (2000, 2004).
9Other similar panel data selection models relax strict exogeneity of covariates in the outcome equation (e.g., Charlier
et al., 2001; Lee and Vella, 2006; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010).
10The differences are: (i) we allow parameters to be time-varying, (ii) our selection process is not binary but ordered
and, as we discuss later, (iii) we model correlated effects parametrically.
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(i) The conditional mean of the unobserved effects in the selection equation is a linear projection
on wt−1i , i.e.,
ξi = L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ]+ ci (2.3a)
E
[
ci
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i ] = 0 , (2.3b)
where L[·] denotes the linear projection operator.
(ii) The composite error it ≡ eit + ci is i.i.d. normally distributed over i given (xs,i,wt−1i ):
it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i ∼ N (0, σ2t ) . (2.3c)
Thus, our model allows for dependence between unobserved effects ξi and right-hand-side co-
variates wit−1. Assumption 1 is slightly more restrictive than that in Arellano and Carrasco (2003,
p.127) which we tighten by assuming the linearity of the conditional mean. In the latter respect,
our approach is more close to that pursued by Arellano et al. (1999) who also model unobserved
effects as a linear projection on the history of the predetermined covariates in their model. The
benefit of assuming a linear conditional mean of ξi is that it allows us to dispense with a nonpara-
metric estimation (via kernel methods) of conditional probabilities Pr
[
Tit = s
∣∣wt−1i ], which one
needs to do if following Arellano and Carrasco’s (2003) approach. We seek to avoid a nonparametric
estimation of the above probabilities primarily due to an acute “curse of dimensionality” problem
associated with it which arises in our application given the high dimensionality of wt−1i (especially,
when t approaches tmax).
Specifically, we let the linear projection L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ] in (2.3a) take the following form a` la
Mundlak (1978):
L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ] = wt−1i ′ηt , (2.4)
where wti =
1∑t
s=1 1{s≤t}
∑t
s=1 w
s
i , and ηt is an (L+1)×1 parameter vector. This is a quite popular
parameterization of correlated effects in the literature (e.g., Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010).
Alternatively, one can choose a less restrictive Chamberlain’s (1980) specification L
[
ξi
∣∣wt−1i ] =
wt−1i
′δt which, for instance, underlines the selection process specified in Wooldridge (1995). Here,
we opt for (2.4) due to its parsimony and relative computational simplicity.11
Under Assumption 1, the selection equation is given by
T ∗it = d
′
it−1ρt + z
′
it−1γt + w
t−1
i
′ηt + it (2.5)
with the associated conditional probability of selecting the sth technology [in line with (2.2)]:
Pr
[
Tit = s
∣∣wt−1i ] = Φ
(
µs,t − d′it−1ρt − z′it−1γt −wt−1i ′ηt
σt
)
−
Φ
(
µs−1,t − d′it−1ρt − z′it−1γt −wt−1i ′ηt
σt
)
, (2.6)
where Φ(·) denotes a standard normal cdf.
11In particular, Chamberlain’s (1980) specification would require estimation of [(L + 1)t + (S − 1)] parameters for
each time period t. Due to high nonlinearity of the objective function and a relatively large t in our application,
the true values of the parameters in (2.1a) may thus not be easy to locate.
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Next, we formalize the treatment of unobserved effects in the outcome equation as well as the
dependence between the two disturbances in (2.1a) and (2.5), where the latter enables us to correct
for selection bias in the outcome equation.
Assumption 2. For i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , tmax and s = 1, . . . , S:
(i) The conditional mean of the unobserved effects in the outcome equation s is a linear pro-
jection on (xs,i,w
t−1
i , it), i.e.,
E
[
αs,i
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = L [αs,i ∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] . (2.7a)
(ii) The error term us,it is mean independent of (xs,i,w
t−1
i ) conditional on it and is linear in
it, i.e.,
E
[
us,it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = E [us,it |it ] = L [us,it |it ] . (2.7b)
In particular, when modeling correlated effects in the outcome equation (2.1a), we consider the
following general form of (2.7a) along the lines of Wooldridge (1995):
L
[
αs,i
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = x′s,i1ϕs,t1 + · · ·+ x′s,itmaxϕs,ttmax+
w′i1ωs,t1 + · · ·+ w′it−1ωs,t(t−1) + ψs,tit . (2.8)
Using the law of iterated expectations, one can easily show that, under our assumptions, the
parameters on xs,it in (2.8) are necessarily constant over t. Thus, (2.8) simplifies to
L
[
αs,i
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , it ] = x′s,i1ϕs,1 + · · ·+ x′s,itmaxϕs,tmax+
w′i1ωs,t1 + · · ·+ w′it−1ωs,t(t−1) + ψs,tit
= x′s,iϕs + w
t−1
i
′ωs,t + ψs,tit , (2.9)
where ϕs, ωs,t and ψs,t areKstmax×1, (L+1)(t−1)×1 parameter vectors and a scalar, respectively.12
Note that this treatment of unobserved effects is in the spirit of Chamberlain (1980).
In Assumption 2(ii), the mean independence of us,it in (2.7b) follows from the assumption
of strict exogeneity of xs,it and predeterminedness of wit−1 (as discussed in Section 3). Unlike
Wooldridge (1995), we also condition the expectation of us,it on w
t−1
i . This is necessary because
we allow the outcome and selection equations to have different covariates and non-zero (cross-
equation) correlation between unobserved effects. Further, note that (2.7b) does not impose any
restrictions on temporal dependence of us,it or in the relationship between us,it and it.
Specifically, we set
L [us,it |it ] = pis,tit , (2.10)
where parameter pis,t is allowed to be time-varying, thus emphasizing the presence of temporal
dynamics in the relationship between us,it and it. The assumption of the disturbance in the
outcome equation having a linear conditional mean is quite standard. A common alternative to it
is the Heckman-type assumption of bivariate normality of the two disturbances which also implies
linearity of the conditional mean of us,it. However, our assumption is less restrictive.
We are now ready to derive the selection bias corrected cost function. Taking the expectation
of Cs,it from (2.1a) conditional on the selection of the sth technology, we obtain
E
[
Cs,it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s] = x′s,itβs + E [αs,i ∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s]+ E [us,it ∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s]
12Note that since xs,it contains unity, the tmax intercept parameters in ϕs are not identified.
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= x′s,itβs + x
′
s,iϕs + w
t−1
i
′ωs,t + %s,tE
[
it
∣∣xs,i,wt−1i , Tit = s]
= x′s,itβs + x
′
s,iϕs + w
t−1
i
′ωs,t + %s,tλs,it , (2.11)
where we have used (2.9) and (2.10) in the second equality. Here, %s,t ≡ pis,t + ψs,t and, given
normality of it under Assumption 1, λs,it is the first moment of the truncated normal distribution.
Our generalized model is consistently estimated via a two-stage procedure. For each time
period t, we first estimate the ordered probit via maximum likelihood as specified in (2.5)–(2.6).
The parameter estimates of the selection equation are then used to obtain consistent estimates of
λs,it. We then estimate the selection bias corrected cost function (2.11), in which predicted λ̂s,it
are used in place of λs,it, via pooled least squares for each technology s, separately.
In order to conduct inference across equations for different technology types s as well as to
account for the use of the predicted regressors λ̂s,it in the second stage, we follow Newey (1984)
and cast the model in a multiple-equation system method-of-moments framework which permits
derivation of an asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for our estimator. That is, by transforming
the estimators from the two stages into their sample moment condition equivalents, i.e.,
fN
(
θ̂
)
=

1∑
1{t=1}
∑
i
∂ logLi1(θ̂†,1)
∂θ̂
′
†,1
...
1∑
1{t=tmax}
∑
i
∂ logLitmax(θ̂†,tmax)
∂θ̂
′
†,tmax
1∑
1{Tit=1}
∑
i
∑
t h1,itv̂1,it
(
θ̂†, θ̂‡,1
)
...
1∑
1{Tit=S}
∑
i
∑
t hS,itv̂S,it
(
θ̂†, θ̂‡,S
)

, (2.12)
we can estimate the system-wide variance-covariance matrix by evaluating the (asymptotic) variance
at our two-stage parameter estimates:[
∂fN(θ̂)
∂θ̂
′
]−1
V̂
{
fN
(
θ̂
)}[(
∂fN(θ̂)
∂θ̂
′
)′]−1
. (2.13)
Here, θ̂ is an estimator of the system-wide parameter vector containing the first- and second-
stage parameters. Specifically, the parameters of the first-stage technology selection equation are
denoted by θ† = (θ′†,1, . . . ,θ
′
†,tmax)
′ with θ†,t = (µ1,t, . . . , µS,t,ρ′t,γ ′t,η′t, σt)′, while the parameters
of the second-stage selection bias corrected cost function are given by θ‡ = (θ′‡,1, . . . ,θ
′
‡,S)′, where
θ‡,s = (β′s,ϕ′s,ω′s, %s,3, . . . , %s,tmax)′. Further, logLit (θ†,t) =
∑
s 1{Tit = s} logPr
[
Tit = s
∣∣wt−1i ]
is the log-likelihood function for the technology selection equation (2.5) for a credit union i in the
time period t, with the probability Pr
[
Tit = s
∣∣wt−1i ] given in (2.6). hs,it = (x′s,it,x′s,i,wt−1i ′, λs,it)′
and v̂s,it are a column vector of right-hand-side covariates from the selection bias corrected cost
function (2.11) and a corresponding least-squares residual for an s-type credit union i in the time
period t, respectively. V̂ is a robust estimate of the variance-covariance of the moment conditions.
Remark 1. Given that the selection equation includes lagged covariates, to estimate model (2.1)
one needs to forgo the first wave of observations. Further, the parameterization of unobserved
effects ξi in the selection equation as a linear projection on the time averages of w
t−1
i implies that
wt−1i = w
t−1
i ≡ (d′it−1, z′it−1)′ for t = 2, resulting in perfect collinearity among right-hand-side
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variables in (2.5). The perfect collinearity arises because, for t = 2, the time averages of wt−1i
are equal to wt−1i . Specifically, w
1
i = w
1
i . Thus, when estimating our generalized model, one can
effectively use observations for t = 3, . . . , tmax only.
Remark 2. Since the parameter vector in (2.11) has both time-invariant and time-varying com-
ponents, we suggest organizing the data for each s and i as follows
E

 Cs,i3...
Cs,itmax
 ∣∣∣∣∣ ·
 =
 x
′
s,i3
...
x′s,itmax
βs +
x
′
s,i
...
x′s,i
ϕs +
w
2
i
′ 0 0
0
. . .
0 w
(tmax−1)
i
′

 ωs,3...
ωs,tmax
+
λs,i3 0 00 . . .
0 λs,itmax

 %s,3...
%s,tmax
 .
Note that the parameter vector ωs = (ωs,3, . . . ,ωs,tmax) is
(tmax+1)(tmax−2)
2 (L + 1) × 1. In the
case of a large tmax, equation (2.11) is likely to suffer from severe multicollinearity due to the
inclusion of many wt−1i covariates. In such instances, we recommend restricting the elements of
ωs,t to be equal, i.e., setting ωs,t1 = · · · = ωs,t(t−1) in the notation used in (2.9). The latter
implies that (2.11) ought to include wt−1i in place of w
t−1
i . This is equivalent to assuming that
unobserved effects αs,i take a (time-varying) Mundlak-type form in the w dimension [as opposed
to Chamberlain’s specification used in Assumption 2(i)]. This restriction significantly decreases the
dimension of ωs to (tmax − 2)(L+ 1)× 1.13
3 Heterogeneous Credit Union Technologies
Before we proceed, we note that the notation used in this section has no connection to that in
previous sections unless specified otherwise.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we define the framework in which we study credit union technologies. Due to
their cooperative nature, credit unions are not profit-maximizers. Instead, they are thought of as
maximizing service provision to their members in terms of quantity, price and variety of services
(Smith, 1984; Fried et al., 1999). Following a wide practice in the literature (Frame and Coelli, 2001;
Frame et al., 2003), we adopt a “service provision approach” under which, given their production
technologies,14 credit unions minimize variable, non-interest cost subject to the levels and types of
outputs, the competitive prices of variable inputs and the levels of quasi-fixed netputs.
We consider the following four outputs: real estate loans (y1), business and agricultural loans
(y2), consumer loans (y3) and investments (y4). We further follow Frame et al. (2003) and Whee-
lock and Wilson (2011, 2013) and include two quasi-fixed netputs (services) to capture the price
dimension of the service provision by credit unions: the average interest rate on saving deposits (y˜5)
and the average interest rate on loans (y˜6). The variable input prices that enter the credit union
cost are the price of capital (w1) and the price of labor (w2). To partially account for the riskiness
of the credit union operations, we also include equity capital (k˜) as a quasi-fixed input in the cost
13We impose this restriction when estimating the model in Section 4.
14That is, given the mix of financial services (outputs) that credit unions opt to provide to their members.
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function, as usually done in the banking literature. Credit unions studies have broadly ignored the
latter under the implicit assumption of risk-neutral behavior of credit union managers. Including
equity capital is also appropriate if one considers it as an additional input to the production of
loans (e.g., see Hughes and Mester, 1998, 2013, among many others). These variables are taken as
arguments of the dual (short-run) variable, non-interest cost function of a credit union, defined as
C
(
y, y˜,w, k˜
)
= min
x
{
x′w | T
(
y, y˜,x, k˜
)
≤ 1; y˜ = y˜0; k˜ = k˜0
}
, (3.1)
where y = (y1, y2, y3, y4) is a vector of outputs, y˜ = (y˜5, y˜6) is a vector of quasi-fixed netputs with
the corresponding vector of observed (fixed) values y˜0; w = (w1, w2) is a vector of the variable
input prices; x = (x1, x2) is a vector of variable inputs; k˜ is a quasi-fixed input with the observed
(fixed) value k˜0; and T (·) is the transformation function.
Compared to a primal specification of the production process, the dual cost approach is ad-
vantageous mainly because it avoids the use of input quantities which can lead to simultaneity
problems given that the allocation of variable inputs is endogenous to a credit union manager’s
decisions. We thus treat the cost function covariates as strictly exogenous, as justified theoretically
by the cost minimization premise and widely accepted in the financial services literature [e.g., see
Hughes and Mester (2014) for an excellent review].15
The data we use in this study come from year-end call reports available from the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), a federal regulatory body that supervises credit unions. The
available data cover all state and federally chartered U.S. credit unions over the period from 1994 to
2011. We discard observations with negative values of outputs and total cost. Likewise, we exclude
observations with non-positive values of variable input prices, quasi-fixed netputs, equity capital,
total assets, reserves and total liabilities. Since y˜ and w1 are interest rates, we follow Wheelock
and Wilson (2011) and also eliminate those observations for which values of these variables lie
outside the unit interval. These excluded observations are likely to be the result of erroneous data
reporting. For the details on construction of the variables from the call reports, see Appendix A.
In this paper we focus on retail, or so-called natural-person, credit unions only. We therefore
exclude corporate credit unions (whose customers are the retail credit unions) from the sample to
minimize noise in the data due to apparent non-homogeneity between these two types of depositories
(this results in a loss of less than 0.7% of observations in the sample). Our data sample thus consists
of 151,817 year-observations for all retail state and federally chartered credit unions over 1994–2011.
3.2 Heterogeneous Technologies
We next proceed to the identification of heterogeneous technologies among credit unions. As
pointed out in the Introduction, the data indicate the presence of significant differences among
credit unions in terms of the mix of services they offer to members. Based on the tabulation of
zero-value observations reported in Table 1, on average, we find that 88% of credit unions in our
sample do not offer business loans (y2) and 31% do not offer mortgage loans (y1) in a given year.
Ignoring this observed heterogeneity in the provision of services across credit unions amounts to
making a strong assumption that all credit unions share the same technology that is invariant to the
15Specifically, the outputs (loans) produced by banks and credit unions are normally said to be exogenous to these
financial institutions because their quantities are determined by the customers’ demand for loanable funds, which
primarily depends on macroeconomic conditions beyond banks’ control. Similarly, financial intermediaries are
largely believed to be operating in perfectly competitive input markets which renders input prices exogenous to
banks and credit unions.
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Table 2. Tabulation of All Possible Heterogeneous Technologies, 1994–2011
Technology Obs. Unique CUs Technology Obs. Unique CUs
Complete Specialization Three-Output Specialization
y1 5 1 y1, y2, y3 20 10
y2 0 0 y1, y2, y4 0 0
y3 673 328 y1, y3, y4 87,122 11,764
y4 0 0 y2, y3, y4 526 306
Two-Output Specialization No Specialization
y1, y2 0 0 y1, y2, y3, y4 18,118 4,466
y1, y3 171 113
y1, y4 4 1
y2, y3 1 1
y2, y4 0 0
y3, y4 45,177 9,446
NOTES: The variables are defined as follows: y1 - real estate loans, y2 - business and
agricultural loans, y3 - consumer loans, y4 - investments.
range of services they provide. This assumption is unlikely to hold since credit unions endogenously
choose their output mixes.
Given the four types of loans we consider, we can identify 15 possible credit union technologies
associated with unique output mixes. The possible heterogeneous technologies are those of the
credit unions specialized in one (complete specialization), two or three types of loans (partial
specialization) and of the unions that produce all four outputs (no specialization). Table 2 presents
a summary of these technologies corresponding to output mixes constructed based on the non-zero-
value loans reported by credit unions. The table shows that the majority of credit unions falls into
the following three categories: (i) those that provide consumer loans and investments y1 ≡ (y3, y4);
(ii) those that provide real estate and consumer loans as well as investments y2 ≡ (y1, y3, y4);
and (iii) those that provide all types of outputs: real estate, business and consumer loans, and
investments y3 ≡ (y1, y2, y3, y4). Together, the three groups of credit unions constitute 99% of all
observations in the sample, suggesting that the remaining one percent likely contains either outliers
or reporting errors. We omit them from our analysis from this point forward. We label the three
above output mixes as “1”, “2” and “3”, respectively, and define their corresponding technologies as
“Technology 1”, “Technology 2” and “Technology 3”. We hereafter use technology and output mix
types interchangeably when referring to credit unions. Also note that the three technology types
are not independent but rather nested with a distinct ordering: a switch from Technology 1 (2)
to Technology 2 (3) implies offering an extra output y1 (y2). Consequently, we model technology
types as ordered alternatives in Section 2.
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of credit unions in our sample by the technology type. This figure
indicates several trends. First, there is an apparent secular decline in the number of credit unions
over time.16 Second, the heterogeneity among U.S. credit unions (as captured by the technology
type) is highly persistent. While today most credit unions still operate under Technology 2 as they
did back in 1994, the presence of other technology types has increased over recent years. Third,
there is a trend among credit unions to shift away from Technology 1 to Technology 2 and even
more so to Technology 3 over time.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the dual cost function as well as
16Mainly due to mergers and acquisitions.
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Figure 1. Tabulation of Credit Unions by Technology Type
several other variables descriptive of the characteristics of credit unions such as total assets, reserves,
etc. All nominal stock variables are deflated to 2011 U.S. dollars using the GDP Implicit Price
Deflator. A comparison of sample mean and median estimates of variables shows clear differences
among credit union technologies. As expected, the size of the credit unions (proxied either by total
assets, reserves or the number of members) increases as one moves from Technology 1 to Technology
3. This is also apparent in Figure 2 which plots kernel density estimates for the log of total assets
tabulated by technology types. The large differences between technology types favor our view that
the assumption of homogeneous (common) technology across credit unions is likely to result in the
loss of information and the misspecification of the econometric model. As we show in Section 4,
this produces biased estimates and potentially misleading results.
3.3 A Generalized Framework
We model the production technology for each of the three identified types of credit unions separately.
We explicitly recognize that, under the abovementioned “service provision approach”, credit unions
minimize non-interest, variable cost subject to different types of outputs among other relevant
constraints. Consequently, the associated production technologies are allowed to be heterogeneous
over credit union types. That is, we consider the following generalization of the dual cost function
(3.1)
Cs
(
ys, y˜,w, k˜
)
= min
x
{
x′w | Ts
(
ys, y˜,x, k˜
)
≤ 1; y˜ = y˜0; k˜ = k˜0
}
∀ s = 1, 2, 3 , (3.2)
where the output vector and the associated transformation and cost functions are indexed by one
of the three types of credit unions s which we have identified above. Note that, unlike the model
of homogeneous technology (3.1), the generalized model (3.2) does not suffer from the problem of
having to deal with zero-value outputs.
Further, the above technological heterogeneity is likely to be an outcome of an endogenous
choice made by credit unions. Based on the set of relevant demand and supply factors, credit
union managers decide what range of financial services to offer to their members and choose the
appropriate technology to provide them at the minimum cost. As seen above, the data particularly
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Table 3. Summary Statistics, 1994–2011
Variable Mean Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
Technology 1
Cost 171.8 0.7 47.6 101.2 205.3 9,866.0
y3 2,648.0 0.9 680.4 1,566.0 3,284.0 16,387.6
y4 1,547.0 0.0 167.9 580.3 1,635.0 262,500.0
y˜5 0.028 0.000 0.017 0.029 0.038 0.056
y˜6 0.100 0.000 0.082 0.095 0.110 0.993
w1 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.695
w2 32.9 0.0 20.1 32.2 43.3 266.3
k˜ 687.6 0.6 175.9 386.7 826.0 54,030.0
Total Assets 4,712.0 22.3 1,215.0 2,769.0 5721.0 373,600.0
Leverage 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.842
Reserves 198.8 0.0 47.6 100.2 214.0 18,270.0
Current Members # 1,127 27 401 745 1,378 43,560
Potential Members # 4,389 1 700 1461 3,000 10,000,000
Multiple-Bond CU 0.321
Federal CU 0.625
State CU (insured) 0.360
Technology 2
Cost 2,244.0 3.2 333.4 767.5 1,965.0 580,500.0
y1 15,780.0 0.0 675.0 2,850.0 10,290.0 6,501,000.0
y3 24,750.0 3.0 3,767.0 8,172.0 20,090.0 9,126,000.0
y4 18,290.0 0.0 1,683.0 4,859.0 13,300.0 4,620,000.0
y˜5 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.027 0.036 0.194
y˜6 0.091 0.000 0.079 0.089 0.100 0.973
w1 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.695
w2 46.6 0.0 37.8 45.2 54.1 6,187.0
k˜ 7,338.0 0.8 1,080.0 2,477.0 5,955.0 2,587,000.0
Total Assets 65,750.0 116.0 8,908.0 20,580.0 51,300.0 24,090,000.0
Leverage 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.351
Reserves 2,638.0 0.0 294.7 707.5 1,800.0 2,563,000.0
Current Members # 8,859 5 1,754 3,570 8,276 2,451,000
Potential Members # 72,790 1 3,500 9,000 32,430 27,000,000
Multiple-Bond CU 0.427
Federal CU 0.610
State CU (insured) 0.378
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Table 3. Summary Statistics, 1994–2011 (cont.)
Variable Mean Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max
Technology 3
Cost 10,030.0 18.3 1,306.0 3,619.0 10,230.0 1,448,000.0
y1 119,400.0 1.0 8,314.0 29,230.0 94,810.0 18,940,000.0
y2 5,831.0 0.0 163.7 710.9 3,577.0 874,500.0
y3 98,490.0 13.0 10,260.0 29,440.0 84,190.0 14,340,000.0
y4 66,820.0 3.0 4,599.0 14,620.0 48,050.0 12,360,000.0
y˜5 0.02 0.000 0.015 0.023 0.033 0.067
y˜6 0.083 0.000 0.072 0.082 0.093 0.873
w1 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.031 0.695
w2 51.6 0.2 42.2 49.9 58.7 324.4
k˜ 32,970.0 10.0 3,902.0 10,250.0 29,870.0 5,079,000.0
Total Assets 326,400.0 224.0 35,860.0 98,320.0 288,600.0 46,930,000.0
Leverage 0.023 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.021 0.439
Reserves 11,880.0 0.0 1,106.0 2,956.0 8,159.0 4,906,000.0
Current Members # 32,070 119 4,972 12,570 33,070 3,867,000
Potential Members # 365,800 250 15,000 66,500 250,000 28,000,000
Multiple-Bond CU 0.307
Federal CU 0.523
State CU (insured) 0.457
NOTES: The variables are defined as follows. Cost - total variable, non-interest cost; y1 - real estate
loans, y2 - business and agricultural loans; y3 - consumer loans; y4 - investments; y˜5 - average saving
pricing; y˜6 - average loan pricing; w1 - price of capital; w2 - price of labor; k˜ - equity capital; Leverage
- the ratio of total debt to total assets; Multiple-Bond, Federal, and State (insured) CU - indicator
variables that take value of one if a CU is multiple-bond, federally accredited, or state-accredited (but
federally insured), respectively. The remaining variables are self-descriptive. Cost, y1, y2, y3, y4, w2,
k˜, Assets, Reserves are in thousands of real 2011 US dollars; y˜5, y˜6, w1, Leverage are interest rates
and thus are unit-free. The numbers of Current and Potential Members are in terms of number of
people. Despite that minima of several variables are reported to be zeros (due to rounding), they are
not exactly equal to zeros.
Figure 2. Kernel Densities of (log) Total Assets
Tabulated by Technology Type, 1994–2011
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suggest considering covariates that correlate with the size of a credit union such as its total assets
and other variables reflecting the credit union’s financial strength and potential for growth and
diversification. After carefully examining the existing literature for potential candidates, we settle
on the following set of variables (z): total assets, reserves, leverage ratio,17 the number of current
and potential members, indicator variables for federally accredited, state accredited and federally
insured,18 and multiple-bond credit unions. Table 3 provides their summary statistics.
We use the total value of assets and the number of current members of the credit union to
capture the size of credit unions (Goddard et al., 2002). One can naturally expect a larger credit
union to seek the diversification of its output mix and thus switch to a less specialized technology.
We proxy the credit union’s potential for growth using the reported level of reserves (Bauer, 2008;
Bauer et al., 2009) and the size of the field of membership, i.e., the number of potential members
(Goddard et al., 2008). The intuition here is as follows. The larger a credit union’s field of
membership is, the more likely it is to consider offering a wider range of services to its members
and thus changing its technology. A larger membership field is likely to generate the demand for
a more diverse menu of financial services. Similarly, the leverage ratio controls for the level of
financial constraint a credit union may be subject to, which can directly influence its growth and
the scope of services it offers. We also condition the choice of technology on whether a credit union
can draw its members from a pool of people with single or multiple associations. This is crucial
since multiple-bond credit unions have a substantial advantage over single-bond ones due to their
ability to grow in size and diversify credit risks more easily (Walter, 2006). For instance, a single-
bond credit union that is authorized to draw its members from a pool of employees of a single plant
only is susceptible to any economic shock that this plant is subject to. Dummies for federally and
state accredited credit unions are used to control for possible intrinsic differences between the two
types of entities.
Unlike the cost function covariates, treating the above variables z as exogenous may however
be invalid. While a larger credit union is able to offer a wider range of services to its members,
the reverse may hold too: a more diversified credit union has a bigger capacity to grow. To avoid
such an endogeneity problem when modeling technology selection, we conceptualize the output mix
selection by credit unions as a lagged process. That is, we assume that a credit union considers its
current position in terms of size, financial health, etc. as well as the service mix it currently offers
to its members when making a decision about the composition of the mix for the next year. This
seems reasonable given that a change in a credit union’s service offerings is hardly an overnight
venture but likely requires considerable time for activities like business planning and analysis, staff
training, advertising, etc. Econometrically, the above assumption is equivalent to requiring that
the lagged values of z be predetermined.
4 Estimation and Results
In order to analyze the consequences of the failure to accommodate heterogeneity in technologies
resulting from endogenous selection as well as the presence of unobserved effects amongst credit
unions, we estimate several auxiliary models in addition to the one developed in Section 2. For the
ease of discussion, all the models we estimate are defined below.
Models Ignoring Unobserved Effects:
Model 1. The model of heterogeneous technologies with endogenous switching given by (2.1)
17Defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
18While all federally accredited unions are insured, the same however cannot be said about all state accredited unions.
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where αs,i = ξi = 0. The model is estimated in two stages using (2.5)-(2.6) and (2.11) as
described in Section 2, under the restriction ηt = ϕs = ωs,t = 0.
Model 2. The model of homogeneous technology. This model is the most widely estimated
in the literature by specifying two outputs instead of four in order to eliminate zero-value
observations. The two outputs are the linearly aggregated loans (y1 + y2 + y3) and investments
(y4). The model is estimated via pooled least squares using the whole sample ignoring a credit
union’s technology type.
Models Controlling for Unobserved Effects:
Model 3. The generalized model of heterogeneous technologies with endogenous switching and
correlated effects given by (2.1) and estimated in two stages as described in Section 2. This is
our preferred model.
Model 4. The model of homogeneous technologies with two outputs and correlated effects.
The model is estimated via least squares using observations for credit unions of all technology
types. In order to facilitate direct comparability between the models, here we model unobserved
effects in the same fashion as in Model 3, i.e., by specifying the correlation between unobserved
effects and the right-hand-side covariates in the spirit of Assumption 2(i).19
All models but generalized Model 3 are likely to be misspecified.20 Further, note that Models
1 and 2 are special cases of Models 3 and 4, respectively. The sole difference between the two sets
of models is that the correlated effects are assumed away in the first set (i.e., in Models 1 and 2).
Comparing the results across these two sets of models enables us to gauge the degree to which the
returns to scale estimates get distorted as a result of the potential model misspecification due to
the ignored dependence between unobserved effects and covariates in the regressions.
Similarly, we estimate Models 2 and 4 to investigate how results change if one does not recognize
technological heterogeneity among credit unions of different types. Both models are estimated under
the most widely used specification in the literature, which assumes a common technology shared by
all credit unions. Here, the misspecification is likely to stem from ignoring both the selectivity and
heterogeneity in technologies. We assess the magnitude of distortions by comparing the estimates
from Model 2 (4) with those from Model 1 (3).
For all models, we use the translog form21 of the dual cost function, onto which we impose
the symmetry and linear homogeneity (in input prices) restrictions. In the first stages of Models
1 and 3 (ordered probit), for the identification we suppress intercepts, normalize σt = 1 and set
µ0,t = −∞ and µ3,t = ∞. All continuous z variables that enter the selection equation are logged
to allow for some degree of nonlinearity. To conserve space, we do not report the results from the
first stage (they are available upon request) and thus directly proceed to the discussion of the main
results.22
The left pane of Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the point estimates of returns to
19An alternative would be to estimate Model 4 via the within estimator that assumes no form of correlation between
unobserved effects and covariates in the cost function (thus modeling these unobserved effects as “fixed effects”).
20Provided our assumptions hold.
21While we emphasize the heterogeneity in credit unions’ production technologies due to their differing output mixes,
we acknowledge that ideally one would also prefer to allow the technology to be heterogeneous among credit unions
for a given output mix. In this paper, we assume such heterogeneity away, which is an undeniable limitation of our
analysis. One could extend our model to allow the cost function to be credit-union specific by, say, employing semi-
or nonparametric methods (e.g., see Malikov et al., 2016), although controlling for unobserved effects in that case
may require a different approach. Here, we opt for the parametric specification mainly for expository purposes as
well as its tractability.
22The signs of statistically significant parameter estimates and mean marginal effects on conditional probabilities
from the first-stage probit are all in line with the intuition.
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Table 4. Summary of Returns to Scale Estimates
Model
Point Estimates of RS Categories of RS, %
Mean St. Dev. Min 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max DRS CRS IRS
Technology 1
(1) 1.229 0.138 0.803 1.141 1.208 1.288 2.476 0.7 0.9 98.4
(2) 1.162 0.075 0.890 1.113 1.150 1.198 2.125 0.1 0.3 99.6
(3) 1.544 0.338 0.848 1.276 1.460 1.750 2.473 0.1 0.1 99.8
(4) 1.232 0.082 0.934 1.176 1.222 1.278 2.226 0.0 0.0 100.0
Technology 2
(1) 1.084 0.059 0.876 1.042 1.080 1.120 1.799 5.0 2.9 92.1
(2) 1.085 0.065 0.878 1.040 1.078 1.120 2.162 5.0 2.6 92.4
(3) 1.372 0.259 0.914 1.167 1.315 1.533 2.488 0.5 0.4 99.1
(4) 1.149 0.087 0.922 1.089 1.137 1.193 2.189 0.6 0.7 98.6
Technology 3
(1) 1.063 0.050 0.864 1.038 1.058 1.079 1.824 0.6 3.9 95.4
(2) 1.038 0.057 0.889 1.001 1.028 1.063 1.703 20.3 7.6 72.1
(3) 1.268 0.124 0.991 1.177 1.274 1.355 2.351 0.0 0.0 100.0
(4) 1.089 0.071 0.914 1.042 1.077 1.120 2.296 3.1 3.2 93.7
Whole Sample
(1) 1.122 0.111 0.803 1.052 1.095 1.161 2.476 3.2 2.5 94.3
(2) 1.100 0.079 0.878 1.044 1.092 1.144 2.162 5.6 2.6 91.7
(3) 1.404 0.284 0.848 1.193 1.335 1.551 2.488 0.3 0.3 99.4
(4) 1.163 0.096 0.914 1.094 1.152 1.218 2.296 0.8 0.9 98.3
NOTE: Percentage points may not sum up to a hundred due to rounding.
scale based on all four models, over the 1996–2011 sample period.23 Here, we break down the
results by the technology type of credit unions. Note that although Models 1 and 3 estimate
credit unions’ cost functions for each technology separately, we also report the statistics for the
whole distribution of credit unions obtained by pooling the results (over technology types) after
the estimation. Similarly, we are able to break down the estimates of returns to scale from Models
2 and 4 by technology types after fitting a single homogeneous cost function for all credit unions.
The credit-union-specific estimates of returns to scale are obtained using the formula that takes
into account the quasi-fixity of equity capital (Caves et al., 1981)
RS =
1− ∂logC
∂log k˜∑
j
∂logC
∂log yj
, (4.1)
where yj ∈ ys are the outputs a credit union produces.
We first focus on the results from Models 1 and 2. The empirical evidence suggests that Model
2, which assumes a homogeneous production technology for all credit unions regardless of their
differing output mixes, tends to underestimate the returns to scale for credit unions of Technologies
1 and 3, whereas the results are quite indistinguishable for Technology 2. Figure 3 shows these
results by plotting kernel densities of the returns to scale estimates from all four models (for now,
ignore those of the estimates from Models 3 and 4). We attribute this differences to biases in the
23The results are for 1996-2011 as opposed to 1994-2011 because the first two waves of the panel are consumed by
lagged covariates and correlated effects in the technology selection equation as discussed in Section 2.
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Figure 3. Kernel Densities of Returns to Scale Estimates
estimates from Model 2 due to the ignored selection and parameter heterogeneity.
We formally test the presence of non-homogeneous credit union technologies via the multiple-
restriction Wald test of H0 : βs = βj for s = 1, 2, 3 (s 6= j) in Model 1. The test strongly
confirms the presence of heterogeneity in credit union cost structures: the p-value is less than
10−100. We also perform a test for the presence of endogenous switching, i.e., a joint Wald test of
H0 : %s,3 = · · · = %s,tmax = 0 for s = 1, 2, 3 in Model 1. The tests reject the null of no selection
bias with p-values less than 10−100 for all three technology groups, confirming that the switching is
not exogenous and hence not “ignorable”. The latter validates the proposition that the estimates
from Model 2 are likely to be subject to selection and misspecification (due to imposed parameter
homogeneity) biases.
The qualitative differences between the models are more transparent when credit unions are
grouped into three returns to scale categories: decreasing returns to scale (DRS), constant return
to scale (CRS) and increasing returns to scale (IRS). We classify a credit union as exhibiting
DRS/CRS/IRS if the point estimate of its returns to scale is found to be statistically less than/equal
to/greater than unity at the 95% significance level.24 For clarity, we note that our notion of scale
economies (i.e., increasing returns to scale) is defined as the cost savings that the credit union enjoys
when increasing its scale of operation, with the cost per unit of output generally decreasing as fixed
costs are spread over more units of output. In this paper, we only focus on such cost savings (if any)
24We use the delta method to construct standard errors for the returns to scale estimates.
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within each credit union technology, as defined by the output mix. That is, our returns to scale
measure does not include potential cost savings associated with the provision of a more diversified
output mix if the credit union switches from Technology 1 to Technology 2 or to Technology 3. Such
cost savings across credit union technologies would have rather been indicative of scope economies,
which is a matter of substantial interest on its own and deserves a close examination in a separate
paper.
Based on the results from Model 1 (see Table 4), we find that virtually all credit unions of
Technology 1 operate under IRS. We however cannot say the same with respect to credit unions
of the other two technology types. Here we find that 7.9% and 4.5% of credit-union-years under
Technology 2 and 3 exhibit non-IRS (i.e., DRS or CRS), respectively. Qualitatively, Models 1 and 2
produce similar results for credit unions operating under Technology 1 and 2. However, the biases
in estimates from Model 2 tell a rather different story for Technology 3. According to this model,
astounding 20.3% of credit unions operate under DRS and are thus scale-inefficient.
However, as mentioned above, Models 1 and 2 are likely to be misspecified and their results
may be misleading because of endogeneity bias due to the ignored dependence between unobserved
effects and covariates in the regressions. We thus proceed to the models that explicitly control for
correlated effects: Models 3 and 4.25 Figure 3 plots the kernel densities of the returns to scale
estimates from these models (see Table 4 for the summary statistics of the estimates).
The evidence suggests that the model which ignores endogenous switching and technological
heterogeneity (Model 4) tends to underestimate the returns to scale at which credit unions operate
across all three technology groups. The kernel densities of estimates from Model 3 are generally
shifted rightward compared to those of estimates from Model 4. Thus, the biases in returns to scale
estimates produced by Model 4 generally appear to be of negative sign.
We again reject the null of a homogeneous (common) cost function across different technology
groups. The p-value corresponding to the Wald test of H0 : βs = βj for s = 1, 2, 3 (s 6= j) on
the coefficients of (2.11) in Model 3 is less than 10−100. Similarly, the Wald tests of H0 : %s,3 =
· · · = %s,tmax = 0 for s = 1, 2, 3 performed on (2.11) again confirm the presence of selection bias in
Model 4 (p-values are less than 10−100 for all three technology groups).26 Thus, the data favor our
preferred generalized Model 3.
Figure 3 also informs of the differences across Models 3 and 4, which account for credit union-
specific correlated effects, and Models 1 and 2, which ignore this unobserved heterogeneity. The
evidence indicates the presence of a negative bias in the returns to scales estimates obtained from
Models 1 and 2: the kernel densities from these models are to the left of those produced by the
corresponding models that control for unobserved effects. The biases appear to be the largest in
the case of Technology 3. The above emphasizes the importance of taking unobserved effects into
account when estimating credit union technologies.
Figure 4 depicts the 95% confidence intervals of the returns to scale estimates from generalized
25Following equation (2.11), we parameterize correlated effects in cost functions as linear projections of (i) all contin-
uous variables included in the first-stage selection equation and (ii) all unique variables in the cost functions, except
for the time trend. Thus, we do not include squared and cross-product terms from the translog cost functions into
the set of variables onto which unobserved effects are assumed to project. Doing the latter would be redundant.
26Note that our assumptions imply two potential channels for selection bias in the outcome equation of interest: (i)
the potential dependence between correlated effects in the outcome equation αs,i and the error in the selection
equation it and (ii) the potential dependence between the error in the outcome equation us,it and it. These two
dependencies are regulated by ψs,t in (2.9) and pis,t in (2.10), respectively, the sum of which is defined to be %s,t
in the selection bias corrected equation (2.11). Hence, while we can use the joint exclusion Wald test on the %s,t
parameters to test for exogeneity/endogeneity of the selection, we are generally unable to formally discriminate
between either of its two channels.
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Figure 4. The 95% Confidence Intervals of Returns to Scale Estimates from Generalized Model 3
Model 3, based on which the right pane of Table 4 is partly populated. These confidence intervals,
which correspond to each observation (credit-union-year) over the 1996–2011 period, are represented
by vertical line segments that are sorted by the lower bound.27 As expected, in contrast to Model 1,
which ignores unobserved effects, Model 3 predicts virtually zero credit unions with non-IRS across
all technology groups: virtually all confidence intervals lie above unity. In contrast, the results from
Model 4 of homogeneous technology still suggest that 6.3% of credit unions of the third technology
type exhibit non-IRS (see Table 4). The latter finding however is not as drastic as the one based
on Model 2, a correlated-effects-free counterpart of Model 4.
Although both Models 3 and 4 strongly support the evidence in favor of IRS almost universally
exhibited by credit unions operating under Technologies 1 and 2, the correspondence in rankings of
credit unions by these models is weak. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of the returns
to scale estimates from the two models is between 0.65 and 0.79. We attribute these differences to
selection and misspecification biases present in Model 4.
As briefly mentioned above, we find the least agreement in results across our generalized Model
3 and Model 4 in the case of Technology 3: the rank correlation coefficient is 0.21. While Model
4 indicates that 3.1% and 3.2% of credit unions in this technology group operate at DRS and
27Note that the credit-union-years are not sorted by their respective RS point estimate but rather by the lower bound
of the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The plot therefore contains “spikes” because the RS estimates for
different credit-union-years have different confidence intervals, some of which are larger/smaller than others.
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Figure 5. Returns to Scale over Time; Estimates from Generalized Model 3
CRS, respectively, based on our preferred Model 3 we however find that virtually all of these
credit unions enjoy IRS. Incidentally, this finding is consistent with the results in Wheelock and
Wilson (2011) who find no significant evidence of DRS and CRS among credit unions in their sample
either. However, it is worth pointing out that, despite qualitative similarities between Wheelock and
Wilson’s and our findings (based on generalized Model 3), the results are not directly comparable.
See Appendix B for a more elaborate discussion.
We find that returns to scale in the credit union industry have increased over the course of years,
as can be seen in Figure 5. The phenomenon is observed for all technology types of credit unions.
However, we find unexpected results when analyzing the relationship between returns to scale of a
credit union and its size (proxied by total assets). Normally, one would expect to see an inverse
relationship between the two. We do confirm it when looking at the entire sample. However, as
Figure 6 shows, this result is not uniform across all technology groups. We find that the estimated
returns to scale (from our generalized Model 3) fall as one moves from small to larger credit unions
that operate under Technologies 1 and 2. However, the returns to scale increase with the size for
credit unions operating under Technology 3. For instance, the estimates of returns to scale from
Model 4 fall with the asset size regardless of the technology type (not reported to conserve space).
While this finding looks puzzling at the first glance, there is an intuitive explanation to it.
Recall that the asset size of the credit unions increases as one moves from Technology 1 to 3 (see
Table 3 and Figure 2). Thus, as credit unions grow and transition from the first technology type
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Figure 6. Returns to Scale by (log) Total Assets Quintiles; Estimates from Generalized Model 3
to the second, a positive effect of scale on the cost naturally wears out. The relationship between
the size and returns to scale however breaks down for credit unions in the third technology group.
One can think of several reasons to explain this. First, an increase in available resources as credit
unions continue to grow enables them to adopt new information processing technologies that are
unaffordable to smaller, more financially constrained credit unions but are substantial cost-savers.
The example of such technologies would be internet banking, automated teller machines, use of
electronic money as well as an access to members’ credit history through the credit rating bureaus.
Second, larger credit unions enjoy greater diversification. On average, credit unions in this group
have a 32 (4) times larger number of members than those belonging to the first (second) technology
group. The diversification comes not only through a larger membership pool, but also through a
wider range of services provided to members as well as an opportunity to engage in more advanced
financial operations (Wilcox, 2005). The latter is partly due to economies of diversification enjoyed
by credit unions as they move from one technology to another (recall that technologies are ordered).
The data suggest the presence of non-negligible economies of scope, which is a matter of substantial
interest on its own. We leave the discussion of it for a future paper. Lastly, larger credit unions can
also protect their market positions by erecting entry barriers thus partly mitigating the decline in
returns to scale as they grow. Hughes and Mester (2013) report a similar finding for large banks.
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5 Conclusion
A trillion dollar worth credit union industry takes up a significant portion of the U.S. financial
services market, catering to almost a hundred million people in the country. Given the dramatic
growth of the industry over the past few decades, there has been a substantial interest in formally
modeling the technologies of credit unions. However, the econometric approaches widely used in
the existing literature somewhat limit our understanding of the structure, dynamics and future
evolution of the credit union industry.
Faced by the presence of an overwhelming number of observations for which the reported values
of credit unions’ outputs are zeros, the existing studies of credit union technologies have mainly
resorted to the linear aggregation of different types of outputs into broader categories. This proce-
dure leads to a loss of valuable information in both econometric and economic senses. In this paper,
we show that the presence of zero-value observations is not merely a data issue but a consequence
of substantial time-persistent heterogeneity amongst credit unions’ technologies as captured by dif-
fering output mixes. This heterogeneity is likely to be an outcome of an endogenous choice made
by credit unions. Models that a priori impose homogeneity and/or overlook credit unions’ endoge-
nous technology selection are likely to produce biased, inconsistent and misleading estimates. The
results are also likely to be biased due to unobserved effects which are widely ignored in the credit
union literature.
We address the above concerns by developing a unified framework that allows the estimation
of credit union technologies that is robust to (i) misspecification due to an a priori assumption
of homogeneous technology, (ii) selectivity bias due to ignoring the endogeneity in technology
selection, and (iii) endogeneity (omitted variable) bias due to a failure to account for unobserved
union-specific effects that are correlated with covariates in the estimated equations.
We develop a generalized model of endogenous switching with ordered choice and correlated
effects that allows treatment of predetermined variables in the selection equation by building on
Wooldridge’s (1995) estimator. We note that our model is not tailored to the analysis of credit
unions only. The framework can be applied to any other panel data study where selectivity and both
observed and unobserved heterogeneity are present. Some examples would be studies of electric or
water utilities, which often include both specialized and integrated companies that operate under
non-homogeneous technologies.
We find that not all U.S. retail credit unions are alike. There is evidence of persistent techno-
logical heterogeneity among credit unions offering different financial service mixes. We consistently
reject the null hypotheses of exogenous technology selection and homogeneous technology among
credit unions and generally find that ignoring this observed heterogeneity or ignoring unobserved
time-invariant effects across units leads to downward biases in returns to scale estimates.
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Appendix A
Table A.1. Call Report Definitions of the Variables
Variable NCUA Account Definition Description
y1 Acct 703 + Acct 386 Real estate loans: first mortgage real estate loans, other
real estate loans
y2 Acct 475 Commercial loans: business and agricultural loans
(MBLs) granted YTD
y3 Acct 025B – y1 – y2 Consumer loans: total loans, less real estate loans, less
commercial loans
y4 Acct 799 Total investments
y˜5 (Acct 380 + Acct 381)/
Acct 018
Average interest rate on saving deposits: dividends on
shares, interest on deposits, divided by total shares and
deposits
y˜6 (Acct 110 + Acct 131)/
Acct 025B
Average interest rate on loans: total (gross) interest and
fee income on loans, fee income, divided by total loan
and leases
w1 (Acct 230 + Acct 250 +
Acct 260 + Acct 270 +
Acct 280 + Acct 290 +
Acct 310 + Acct 320 +
Acct 360)/Acct 018
Price of capital: travel and conference expense, office oc-
cupancy expense, office operations expense, educational
and promotional expense, loan servicing expense, profes-
sional and outside services, member insurance, operating
fees (examination and/or supervision fees), miscellaneous
operating expenses, divided by total shares and deposits
w2 Acct 210/(Acct 564A +
0.5*Acct 564B)
Price of labor: employee compensation and benefits, di-
vided by full-time equivalent employees [Number of credit
union employees who are: Full-time (26 hours or more)
+ 0.5*Part-time (25 hours or less per week)]
k˜ Acct 931 + Acct 668 +
Acct 945 + Acct 658 +
Acct 940 + Acct 602
Equity: regular reserves, appropriation for non-
conforming investments, accumulated unrealized gains
(losses) on available-for-sale securities and other compre-
hensive income, other reserves, undivided earnings, net
income
C Acct 010 Total variable, non-interest cost: total non-interest ex-
penses
Total Assets Acct 010 Total assets
Leverage (Acct 860C + Aacct 820a +
Acct 825 + Acct 018)/
Acct 010
Total liabilities [total borrowing, accrued dividends and
interest payable on shares and deposits, accounts payable
and other liabilities, total shares and deposits], divided
by total assets
Reserves Acct 931 + Acct 668 Regular reserves, appropriation for non-conforming in-
vestments
Current Members # Acct 083 Total number of current members
Potential Members # Acct 084 Total number of potential members
Appendix B
As discussed in Section 4, based on our preferred Model 3, which accounts for both the endogenous
choice of the output mix as well as correlated unobserved heterogeneity, we find that virtually
all U.S. credit unions (99.4% of the sample) enjoy IRS during our sample period. Incidentally,
this finding is consistent with the results in Wheelock and Wilson (2011) who also find significant
evidence of IRS among credit unions in the U.S. However, despite qualitative similarities between
Wheelock and Wilson’s and our findings, the results are not directly comparable.
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First, our sample periods differ: we consider the period of 1994–2011, whereas Wheelock and
Wilson (2011) examine the 1989–2006 period.28 Second, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) obtain their
returns to scale estimates from an admittedly more flexible nonparametric cost function whereas
our estimation approach is parametric. Third, they aggregate outputs in order to eliminate zero-
value observations and fit a homogeneous production technology for all credit unions. Their cost
function also does not include equity capital as one of the inputs. Fourth, Wheelock and Wilson
(2011) do not explore the possibility of endogeneity in a credit union’s choice of the output mix.
Lastly, while controlling for time effects, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) however left the issue of
unobserved time-invariant effects unaddressed. All of these issues undercut the comparability of
Wheelock and Wilson’s (2011) and our results.
In order to take a closer look at our results, we use our data sample to estimate an auxiliary
model that closely follows Wheelock and Wilson’s (2011) approach. To at least partly mitigate the
above-referenced comparability problem, we adapt Wheelock and Wilson’s (2011) nonparametric
specification of a homogeneous credit union technology to this paper’s setup with some fine-tuning.
Specifically, the point of our departure is Wheelock and Wilson’s (2011) baseline model given
in equation (4) of their paper. To ensure a more meaningful comparison of our results with those
obtained via their approach, consistent with our specification of the production technology of credit
unions, we additionally condition the credit union’s cost function on a quasi-fixed equity capital.
The stochastic cost function is then defined as follows:
C = C(y, y˜,w, k˜)+ u,
where C(·) is an unspecified nonparametric function, y ≡ [(y1 + y2 + y3), y4], and u is a stochastic
error. As earlier, we impose the linear homogeneity property by dividing the cost C and all input
prices w by the price of labor (w2).
Following Wheelock and Wilson (2011), the model is estimated in logs via a local-linear fitting.
Unlike them, we however do not employ any dimension reduction techniques, the usual argument
for the use of which is the mitigation of the so-called “curse-of-dimensionality” problem whereby the
nonparametric estimator’s rate of convergence decreases with the number of continuous covariates.
Given the fairly large sample size (> 150, 000 observations) and a rather small number of continuous
regressors in the model (a total of six), the “curse of dimensionality” is unlikely to cause severe
problems in our application. More importantly, the principal component extraction technique
favored by Wheelock and Wilson (2011) for reducing the dimensionality of data may not be a
suitable solution here because it relies on the independent linear information in the data. Given
that the core purpose of a nonparametric specification is to allow for potential nonlinearities in
the conditional mean of the cost function, the use of principal components therefore appears to be
rather self-defying.
Table B.1 reports the median nonparametric estimates of the expansion path scale economies
(EPSE), a preferred measure of returns to scale for credit unions by Wheelock and Wilson (2011).
EPSE is computed via the formula given in equation (11) in Wheelock and Wilson (2011):
EPSE =
C((1 + γ)y, ·)(
1+γ
1−γ
)
C((1− γ)y, ·) ,
where, following the authors, we set γ = 0.05. That is, the reported EPSE measures the returns to
scale exhibited by a credit union along its expansion path going from the origin through its observed
28Unfortunately, we have no access to public data on credit unions that date back beyond 1994.
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Table B.1. Nonparametric EPSE Estimates for a Homogeneous Technology
Technology Type
Median Categories of RS, %
Point Est. DRS CRS IRS
Technology 1 0.987 1.6 20.0 78.3
Technology 2 0.995 8.4 28.3 63.2
Technology 3 0.994 4.8 34.2 61.0
Whole Sample 0.993 6.1 26.9 66.9
NOTE: Percentage points may not sum up to a hundred
due to rounding.
output vector, evaluated in the [95%, 105%] interval of its output quantities. The definition of
EPSE is such that values less/greater than unity are indicative of increasing/decreasing returns to
scale. We note that EPSE, which relies on the estimates of the conditional mean as opposed to its
gradients, is quite different from the elasticity-based measure of returns to scale in (4.1), based on
which we draw our main conclusions in this paper.
Like before, we group credit unions into three returns to scale categories. A credit union is said
to exhibit DRS/CRS/IRS if its EPSE point estimate is found to be statistically greater than/equal
to/less than unity at the 95% significance level. We use wild bootstrap with 399 iterations to
construct standard errors for the EPSE estimates. The break-down of the results by technology
type is provided in the right panel of Table B.1. In a stark contrast to our preferred model 3,
the EPSE estimates from a nonparametric specification indicate that a non-negligible fraction of
credit unions in our sample (33.1%) exhibit non-IRS with the fraction growing substantially as one
moves from Type 1 to Type 3 credit unions.29 Rather surprisingly, the latter findings dramatically
differ from those reported in Wheelock and Wilson (2011), who find no EPSE-based evidence
against pervasive IRS amongst credit unions. Given that our nonparametric specification closely
follows Wheelock and Wilson (2011), we suppose the primary reason why our EPSE estimates may
still differ from theirs is because they (i) do not include financial capital as a quasi-fixed input
and (ii) transform the raw data via the principal component extraction technique. Such a data
transformation might lead to the loss of nonlinear information in the regressors which, in turn, might
affect the estimates of scale economies. Further, the sensitivity of the scale economies estimates to
the inclusion of equity capital in the model has also been documented in the case of commercial
banks (Hughes and Mester, 1998). While the analysis of factors underlying the differences between
our EPSE estimates and those reported in Wheelock and Wilson (2011) is unarguably of great
empirical interest, their thorough investigation is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
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